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ABSTRACT
Attacks on shareholder primacy have come from numerous quarters, arguing for
expansion of the class of beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties. Regarding duties
to creditors—the focus of this symposium—a long line of cases has recognized that
once a firm is insolvent, creditors should be the primary beneficiaries of directors’
fiduciary duties. Then in 1991, Chancellor Allen’s famous discussion in Credit
Lyonnais identified a special “vicinity of insolvency.” In that special situation when a
firm approaches insolvency, Chancellor Allen suggested, creditors should be included
with shareholders in the “community of interests” to whom directors owe fiduciary
duties.
Of late, even economically oriented scholars—typically defenders of
shareholder primacy—have jumped in to argue for a broader class of beneficiaries.
These scholars argue that directors should seek to maximize value not just for
shareholders, but for all financial claimants of the firm as a group, and even
performance creditors—those owed some contractual performance by the firm.
In this Article, I suggest that at least for commercial creditors, fiduciary duties
that include such creditors are unnecessary and may be counterproductive. Much of my
discussion focuses on bank lending to large companies. Bank creditors’ relative
sophistication and the nature of their contractual relations with their borrower firms
suggest that ex post judicial gap filling should be rare. Bank loans are typically
renegotiated well before the borrower firm reaches insolvency, leaving no contract gaps
for courts to fill. Other discussion applies to commercial creditors more generally. In
particular, the standard justification for including creditors as beneficiaries of directors’
fiduciary duties—the fear of excessive risk taking, or “overinvestment,” by managers of
distressed firms—seems a rather weak rationale.
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GAP FILLING IN THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY
Frederick Tung*
Drafters should be reluctant to enact default standards without first asking why the
standards were missing from private contracts.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Shareholder primacy is seemingly in tatters, and the question whether corporate
directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors as the firm approaches insolvency is merely a
subset of the more general issue of shareholder primacy.

Under the well-known

shareholder primacy rubric—long dominant among courts and commentators—directors’
fiduciary duties run exclusively in favor of the corporation’s common shareholders, and
duty requires the board to maximize shareholder returns. The economic justification is
straightforward: because common shareholders are the firm’s residual claimants, they
have the right incentives to maximize firm value. This is socially beneficial, as well as of
private benefit to shareholders. Favoring shareholders with managerial fiduciary duties
harnesses the zest for private wealth maximization to serve the broader goal of social
wealth maximization.2
Attacks on shareholder primacy have come from numerous quarters, arguing for
expansion of the class of beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties. Corporate social
responsibility scholars have long championed a fiduciary duty broadened to include

*

Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. A.B. 1983, Cornell; J.D. 1987,
Harvard Law School. Web: http://www.law.emory.edu/cms/site/index.php?id=ftung.
E-mail: fred.tung@law.emory.edu. I owe special thanks to Bill Carney, Peter Huang,
Jonathan Lipson, and Bob Rasmussen for comments on an earlier draft of this Article, as
well as to participants in the symposium for which this Article was written—Twilight in
the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies, held at the
University of Maryland School of Law, November 4, 2005.
1 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
Yale L.J. 541, 602 (2003).
2 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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workers or local communities.3 Recent team production theory argues that directors are
not and should not be directly accountable to shareholders or any other specific corporate
stakeholder. Instead, in order to promote and protect firm-specific investment by diverse
team members, directors owe fiduciary duties to “the corporate coalition as a whole.”4
Regarding duties to creditors—the focus of this symposium—a long line of cases has
recognized that once a firm is insolvent, creditors should be the primary beneficiaries of
directors’ fiduciary duties.5 Then in 1991, Chancellor Allen’s famous discussion in Credit
Lyonnais identified a special “vicinity of insolvency.”6 In that special situation when a
firm approaches insolvency, Chancellor Allen suggested, creditors should be included with
shareholders in the “community of interests” to whom directors owe fiduciary duties. Of
late, even economically oriented scholars—typically defenders of shareholder primacy—
have jumped in to argue for a broader class of beneficiaries. These scholars argue that
directors should seek to maximize value not just for shareholders, but for all financial
claimants of the firm as a group,7 and even performance creditors—those owed some
contractual performance by the firm.8

3

See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); Kent Greenfield, Using
Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory
Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002).
4 Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 298 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981); Geyer v.
Ingersoll, 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
6 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Not Reported in
A.2d, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 1099, 1155 & n.55 (emphasis supplied).
7 See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law:
A Neotraditional
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214 (1999) (arguing that hypothetical
contract among diversified investors would require directors to maximize sum of all
financial claims against firm, and not just equity). For Smith, this broader fiduciary duty
that would apply all the time—not just in financial distress. See infra Part II.C.
8 See Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers’ Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm’s
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813 (2002)
(arguing that in order to avoid inefficient managerial decisions, performance creditors must
be included with financial creditors identified by Smith—so-called “payment creditors”).
2
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In this Article, I suggest that at least for commercial creditors, fiduciary duties that
include such creditors are unnecessary and may be counterproductive.9 Throughout the
paper, I use the term “IFDC” (insolvency fiduciary duties to creditors) to refer to the basic
–and questionable—notion that for a firm at or near insolvency, creditors should be
included in the class of beneficiaries to whom firm managers owe fiduciary duties. Much
of my discussion focuses on bank lending to large companies.10 Bank creditors’ relative
sophistication and the nature of their contractual relations with their borrower firms
suggest that judicial intervention to rewrite contracts ex post should be rare.11 Other
discussion applies to commercial creditors more generally. In particular, the standard
justification for IFDC—the fear of excessive risk taking, or “overinvestment,” by
managers of distressed firms—seems a rather weak rationale.

9

Fiduciary duties to other types of creditors may or may not be appropriate, an issue I do
not engage here. Tort creditors may be the most sympathetic of claimants. Commentators
have rightly noted the socially harmful cost externalization that corporations may visit on
tort victims. As remedies, commentators have argued for unlimited shareholder liability;
see Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 716-17 (1985);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based
Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM L. REV. 1203 (2002);
or priority for tort claims over contract claims; see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured
Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994), or both. See David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991). See also Jonathan
C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially
Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003) (arguing that creditors with low
volition, cognition, and exit opportunities should enjoy fiduciary duty of corporate
managers).
10

Consistent with a big company focus, I also take Delaware law as the primary exemplar
of IFDC rules.
11 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. Creditors in the close corporation context may be
less sophisticated. Corporate law has generally imputed greater fiduciary duties in the
close corporation context than for public companies. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578 (1975) (enunciating equal opportunity rule for close
corporation stock repurchases). Consistent with this approach, unsophisticated creditors to
close corporations may warrant stronger IFDC protections than sophisticated commercial
creditors to public companies. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784

3
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Part II recounts the trend to expand the universe of beneficiaries of corporate
directors’ fiduciary duties.

It describes the standard contractarian framework for

explaining shareholder primacy and the adaptation of this contractarian approach to
include additional beneficiaries. In Parts III and IV, I question the contractarian case for
fiduciary duties to creditors. Part III argues that sophisticated bank credit agreements may
be substantially complete by the time a firm approaches insolvency.

Through

renegotiation—typical with defaulted bank loans—the parties have ordinarily had a second
chance to fill any gaps in their contract by the time a firm approaches insolvency.12 The
judicial gap filling championed by incomplete contracts theory may therefore be
unnecessary. Part III also questions the overinvestment rationale for IFDC. Part IV relies
on a few actual cases to illustrate the divergence between the hypothetical bargain of
incomplete contracts theory and the actual bargains that creditors make with firms. Part V
discusses the question whether IFDC rules are pernicious or merely harmless. Part VI
concludes.
II.

THE CASE FOR EXPANDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Ordinarily, shareholders are the only corporate stakeholders to whom firm
managers owe fiduciary duties.

Though other groups—creditors and employees, for

example—are also interested in the corporation’s success, their relations with the
corporation are typically formed through and governed primarily by explicit contracts.13

(1992) (recognizing IFDC rights in dispute between two former partners of general
partnership who later substituted corporate structure for partnership structure).
12 The prospect of renegotiation plays a prominent role in the initial structuring of relations
between bank lenders and their borrowers. Because of information asymmetry and high
enforcement costs, the parties are typically content to rely on ex post renegotiation to deal
with borrower default, rather than attempt ex ante to contract for plausible contingencies.
This indifference to conditioning performance on future states of the world contrasts
sharply with the standard approach of incomplete contracts theory, which assumes that
parties pursue cost-efficient ex ante contractual risk allocation. See infra Part III.A.1.
13 See William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization:
Bargaining under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982). My analysis of course excludes tort creditors and
other involuntary claimants, whose predicament other commentators have addressed,
through various proposals. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
4
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These parties are generally expected to protect their interests through their explicit
contracts. This Part recounts the trend toward expanded fiduciary duties for creditors.
A.

Fiduciary Duties for Incomplete Contracting

According to the standard contractualist view of the corporation that has come to
dominate corporate scholarship, corporate fiduciary duties should be viewed merely as gap
filling devices for incomplete contracts between shareholders and firm managers.14
Because of shareholders’ special status as residual risk bearers of the firm, their
arrangement with the firm is necessarily open-ended. Shareholders ordinarily suffer the
firm’s marginal losses and enjoy its marginal gains.

Every decision by the firm’s

management therefore directly affects shareholder wealth. Writing an explicit contract
with firm management to govern this relationship would be uniquely difficult. It would be
hopelessly incomplete, given the myriad complex decisions that firm managers must make
in order to run the company.15 Instead, corporate fiduciary duty supplies a general gapfilling standard: firm managers should run the firm for shareholders’ benefit.16 Fiduciary
duty functions to complete the inevitably incomplete agency arrangement between
shareholders and managers. In applying fiduciary duties, courts should attempt to fill in
the hypothetical contract to which shareholders and managers would have agreed ex ante
had they considered the issue later disputed.17

14

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 92.
Moreover, constricting managerial discretion too finely with detailed contracting
frustrates managers’ and investors’ pursuit of the joint gains from specialization.
Managerial decision making is what investors are buying when they invest their capital.
They rely on managers’ expertise in running the business, and constraints too stringent
may hinder managers in pursuing the task. See id.
16 Shareholders also enjoy structural protections that encourage managers’ attention to
shareholder concerns. For example, shareholders elect and may remove directors. DEL.
GEN. CORP. L. §§ 211(b), 141(k); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §§ 7.28(a), 8.08.
17 Trust, fairness, equity are all quaint concepts but beside the point. “Fiduciary duties are
not special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations,
derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.” See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. Econ. 425, 427
(1993) (footnote omitted).
15
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In general, when managers run the firm with the goal of maximizing shareholder
returns, firm value is maximized as well, which benefits society. Shareholder primacy
benefits not just private investors but society as a whole.
B.

The Case for Including Creditors

When a firm is insolvent, creditors become the firm’s primary residual risk
bearers.18 Shareholders have essentially lost their bet on the company, and post-insolvency
investments by the firm are gambles with the creditors’ money. With creditors as the
firm’s residual claimants, the analysis goes, managers’ fiduciary duties should shift to
creditors. Instead of maximizing shareholder wealth, managers should instead look after
the interests of creditors when the firm is insolvent.19 This approach is fairly settled law in
Delaware and other jurisdictions.
With the firm’s insolvency, managers would face perverse incentives under a
shareholder primacy rule.20 Limited liability for shareholders means that shareholders
enjoy the potentially unlimited upside from a spectacularly risky investment, but downside
risk is borne by creditors.

Firm managers faithfully pursuing shareholder wealth

maximization, therefore, may be tempted to make very risky investments, since spectacular
returns—however unlikely—would inure to the benefit of shareholders, while losses would
be borne by creditors. Even investments with small or negative expected value for the firm

18

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, among others, have pointed out the numerous groups
that have residual interests in the firm’s financial success. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79
WASH. U. L. Q. 403 (2001).
19 Geyer v. Ingersoll, 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Production Resources Group v.
NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del. Ch. 2004).
20 Jensen and Meckling showed us long ago, of course, that the agency cost of debt is more
nuanced than the typical zone-of-insolvency discussion describes. Insolvency is not some
magic event that triggers perverse incentives for managers that do not exist before
insolvency. Instead, the agency cost of debt is increasing in the percentage of outside
financing comprised of debt versus equity. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 344 (1976).
6
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would be pursued, as long as there were positive expected value to shareholders.21 Social
welfare and shareholder welfare may diverge, then, when the firm is insolvent.
Delaware cases have also recognized that these perverse incentives for managers
may operate even as the firm nears insolvency. The closer is the firm to insolvency, the
greater the incentive for managers—now likely to be gambling at least in part with
creditors’ money—to make risky and even negative expected value investments in order to
maximize shareholder returns. For Delaware courts, shareholders’ special status begins to
fade even before the firm becomes insolvent.22 In the amorphous “vicinity of insolvency,”
directors are instructed to include creditors with shareholders in the “community of
interests” to whom directors owe fiduciary duties.23
C.

The Case for Further Expansion of Fiduciary Duties

Now, one might view this insolvency or vicinity-of-insolvency problem as a
peripheral concern. Most firms most of the time are not near insolvency, the thinking
goes.

So managers armed with the shareholder primacy dogma will have the right

incentive to maximize firm value most of the time. So fiduciary duties to creditors may be
merely a special situation requiring an unorthodox rule.

21

See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489-91 (1993).
22 Courts and commentators seem to differ as to whether the proper beneficiaries of
fiduciary duties in the “vicinity of insolvency” differ from those for a firm that is clearly
insolvent. Compare Production Resources, 863 A.2d at 789-91 (holding that directors’
vicinity-of-insolvency duty was to maximize firm value, but upon insolvency, duties run to
creditors alone); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,
Not Reported in A.2d, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 1099, 1155 & n.55 (suggesting that directors’
duties in the vicinity of insolvency should run to the “corporate enterprise,” which includes
creditors as well as stockholders), with Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers
and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 71 (1998) (arguing
that directors should promote creditor interests in the vicinity of insolvency, and that
Credit Lyonnais creates an affirmative right of action for creditors). I ultimately suggest
that any duty to creditors may be pernicious, so that I do not address these various
distinctions.
23 Credit Lyonnais, 17 DEL J. CORP L. at 1155 n.55.
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The problem with this view, Tom Smith has argued,24 is that the “zone of
insolvency” may not be a coherent construct. Big risky bets are increasingly available to
firm managers. Bet-the-company projects are not hard to find. What this means is that
managers do not have far to search for projects that will maximize shareholder value if
successful but will leave the company insolvent if unsuccessful. In other words, the firm’s
“nearness” to insolvency—the value of its equity, in conventional balance sheet terms—
does not affect managers’ latitude to make negative expected value bets that are good for
shareholders. The only difference between a firm “near” insolvency in the conventional
sense, and one that is not, is the size of the bet that would push the firm into insolvency.
But shareholder primacy gives no guidance in this regard. It contains no limiting principle
that tells managers above all not to bankrupt the firm. A diversified shareholder wants
managers to take all shareholder wealth maximizing bets, especially those for which losses
would be born by creditors! From this perspective, every firm is always in the zone of
insolvency.
Smith further argues that shareholders are not the only stakeholders with
imperfectly specified contractual rights against the corporation. Creditor contracts are
similarly incomplete, albeit perhaps not in the same degree. For Smith, a hypothetical
contract among fully diversified investors would not specify shareholder wealth
maximization as its fundamental goal.

The diversified investor—one who holds the

market portfolio, according to Smith—would invest proportionally in the equity and bonds
of every issuer.25 That investor would therefore be indifferent as to any distributional
issues among the classes of an issuer’s securities, as long as managers’ actions maximized
the sum of the values of the investor’s financial claims on the company. The general
charge for directors, then, should be financial value maximization (FVM):

directors

24

See Smith, supra note 7.
Under CAPM, rational investors will diversify among all classes of capital assets,
including both corporate stocks and bonds. In fact, they will hold the "market
portfolio," that is, a portfolio that is a microcosm of all capital assets, in which each
type of capital asset has the same place proportionally in the rational investor's
portfolio as it does in the capital market as a whole.
Id. at 217.

25
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should seek to maximize the sum of all financial claims on the issuer, not just those of
shareholders.26
Alon Chaver and Jesse Fried expand on Smith’s analysis to argue for an even
broader class of beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties.27

They question Smith’s

limitation that only financial claims deserve managerial fiduciary duties. Instead, Chaver
& Fried point out that performance creditors—parties owed contractual performance from
the firm—need also to be part of the calculus, lest managers take inefficient actions in
insolvency to benefit financial claims at the expense of performance creditors. With
insolvency, firm managers can externalize some costs of contract breach since the firm will
likely be financially unable to pay full expectancy damages to the other contracting party.
Under Smith’s FVM approach, therefore, managers might be tempted to breach valuecreating contracts in order to benefit financial claimants, even when the cost of breach
exceeds the benefit to financial claims.28 If performance creditors are cut out of firm
managers’ maximizing calculus, then the same problem that would plague society and
bondholders in a world of shareholder value maximization would plague society and
performance creditors in a world of financial value maximization. Managers might take
actions that maximize financial claims but that harm performance creditors by an even
greater margin. In other words, managers might make inefficient decisions. According to
Chaver and Fried, shareholders would benefit ex ante from the “FVM-plus-performance
creditors” approach, since performance creditors would offer better terms up front given
this endgame protection.29
In the following two Parts, I suggest that these various approaches to crafting
hypothetical contracts for creditors may be problematic.

26

Id.
See Chaver & Fried, supra note 8.
28 See id. at 1834-35. Chaver and Fried also note the perverse incentive of firm managers
to underinvest in the firm’s capacity for contract performance when the firm is insolvent.
See id. at 1831.
29 Id. at 1843.
27

9
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III.

GAP FILLING FOR CREDITORS

Theorizing about IFDC has to date suffered from abstraction.

Scholars have

proceeded with too-simple models of corporate contracting, which affects the framing of
claimants’ hypothetical bargains and conclusions about the content of these bargains. In
this Part, I question the assumption that sophisticated credit contracts—bank lending
agreements in particular—have gaps that judges can fill. I also suggest that problems of
inefficient investment—to the extent they exist—may not be easily solved by expanding
fiduciary duties.
A.

Do Sophisticated Lenders Leave Gaps in Their Contracts?

Following the standard incomplete contracts approach, nexus-of-contracts
corporate scholars explain fiduciary duties as contractual in nature. Fiduciary duty serves
as the ultimate gap-filling device, completing the open-ended shareholder-manager
contract with a hypothetical bargain crafted according to majoritarian default rules. Within
the mainstream incomplete contracts literature, hypothetical bargain analysis is not without
its skeptics. For example, much of the hypothetical bargain literature fails to defend or
even discuss the presumed factor endowments of the parties to any hypothetical bargain.
Party rationality and informational endowments in particular may be crucial factors for the
substantive outcome of any majoritarian hypothetical bargain analysis.30
For our purposes, application of hypothetical bargain analysis to IFDC suffers from
an important specific problem: by the time a firm is in the neighborhood of insolvency, it
is far from clear that sophisticated credit contracts have gaps that need filling by courts.
Often these contracts are renegotiated before the firm nears insolvency. For bank credit
agreements especially, pre-insolvency workout is the norm.31 Bank and borrower have a

30

See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991).
31 Gur Huberman & Charles Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic
Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (1988); Charles Kahn & Gur Huberman, Default,
Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 51 (1989).
Public debt contracts—bond offerings—are renegotiated via exchange offer, “the preferred
technique of corporate management to effect a recapitalization and avert insolvency.”
John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
10
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second chance—and often multiple opportunities—to fill the gaps in their contract. Loan
agreements may therefore be substantially complete by the time the borrower is in the zone
of insolvency. Renegotiation has already filled any gaps that may have existed. In
addition, because of this central role for renegotiation—which the parties anticipate at the
time of their initial contract--the structure and function of bank loan agreements differ
from the standard contract of incomplete contracts theory.
1.

Contracts for Strategic Renegotiation

Incomplete contracts theory generally assumes that contracts aspire to full statecontingency. Bank loan agreements may not fit this premise. The theory assumes that
parties try to “get it right” in the contract, specifying in a cost-efficient manner the agreed
outcomes in the most plausible future states of the world. These aspiring-fully-statecontingent contracts condition the parties obligations, specifically allocating risk for the
most likely scenarios. Contracting costs limit the extent to which the parties can cover all
contingencies in their agreement,32 but the basic goal is to get it right—specifying the
parties desired outcomes in the most likely future states—in order to avoid future disputes
or costly renegotiation.33 Majoritarian defaults supplement the parties’ efforts in this
regard, economizing on contracting costs by supplying gap fillers to mimic the agreement
the parties would have reached had they thought to address the particular contingency.34

Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207,
1224 (1991).
32 In a world of positive transaction costs, the parties will ideally negotiate and draft for
progressively more remote contingencies until the marginal cost of contracting exactly
equals the anticipated marginal benefit from addressing the particular contingency.
33 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992) (describing standard view of
incomplete contracts).
34 More generally, majoritarian default rules reduce contracting costs by offering the
parties an “off-the-rack” contract that most parties would prefer. Only a minority of
contracting parties need expend costs to contract out of the law-supplied default. For
refinements on this view of the desirability of majoritarian defaults, see Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93-94 (1989) (identifying strategic incompleteness as alternative
source of contract incompleteness, in addition to transaction cost explanation); Charny,
11
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Renegotiation is another possible approach to addressing unanticipated contingencies, but
given the costs of renegotiation and strategic hurdles to its success, the original contract
ought really attempt to “get it right” and thus avoid future disputes and the need for
subsequent renegotiation. Gap filling aids the parties in getting it right.
The typical loan agreement, by contrast, seems to pursue a different goal. It makes
no attempt to condition performance for all or even the most plausible future states of the
world. Instead, the borrower’s repayment obligation is absolute.35 On its face, the loan
agreement seems harsh and inflexible. The borrower’s repayment obligation obtains in all
future states of the world. There are no excuses. No attempt is made to reduce the debt
obligation or interest rate or adjust the payment schedule for the borrower’s subsequent
bad fortune or acts of God.36 Upon the borrower’s default, the lender’s remedies ordinarily
enable it to severely damage or destroy the borrower’s business.37
But the harshness of the agreement belies the reality of how things ordinarily go
between bank and borrower. The lender typically forbears from exercising the severe
remedies described in the original credit agreement. Instead, the parties renegotiate. From
this vantage point, it appears every loan agreement is woefully incomplete. What the
contract specifies is almost never what ultimately occurs; instead, renegotiation ensues.
Clearly, what is going on here differs from the standard aspiring-fully-state-contingent
contract of theory. Loan agreements are not trying to “get it right.” Instead, the loan
agreement can perhaps best be understood as a strategic device for structuring

supra note 30, at 1842 (noting that cost-minimizing default rule may not necessarily be
majoritarian rule when costs of contracting out are asymmetric).
35 The loan contract is obligationally complete—that is, it fully specifies the borrower’s
obligation to repay the loan in full. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33, at 730
(distinguishing between obligational incompleteness and contingent incompleteness). The
loan agreement contains myriad other requirements as well, violations of which trigger
default and immediate acceleration of the debt. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
36 Moreover, multiple covenant obligations restrict the borrower’s ability to engage in
transactions or operate in a way that would impair its ability to repay. Covenant violations
trigger default, even when the borrower has not missed a payment.
37 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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renegotiation in the event of default. The agreement sets the parties’ leverage—basically
giving it all to the lender—in order to enhance the prospects for efficient renegotiation
should it later be required.38
The lending relationship is characterized by information asymmetry and high
contracting and enforcement costs. Contracting for renegotiation may be a useful device in
this environment.39 The borrower will understand its operations and markets better than
the lender.

Many likely contingencies may be difficult to observe or impossible or

prohibitively costly to verify—to prove in court. A borrower’s default might be caused by
any number of disparate factors, but only the borrower may know for sure. Even after
default, the borrower’s assets will ordinarily be worth more in the hands of company
management than in the lender’s hands. Whether the lender will be able to extract any of
that value for repayment, however, may depend on the cause of default, which the lender
must investigate.

If default was caused by exogenous events—general economic

conditions, for instance—the lender might as well leave the assets with the borrower and
allow the business to continue. The borrower’s management may be best situated to
realize value from the firm’s assets; the lender is unlikely to be better.40 On the other hand,
if default was caused by circumstances peculiarly within the borrower’s control—fraud or
mismanagement, say—the lender will not generally wish to leave the assets with current
management. The assets are worth more to the lender in its own hands.41

38

Kahn & Huberman, supra note 31, at 61; Huberman & Kahn, supra note 31, at 480;
Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of
Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599, 624 (1999).
39 See Kahn & Huberman, supra note 31, at 51.
40 Bringing in new management is also a possibility. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance 154 U. PA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 28). That has its own perils, however, and lenders
are not likely to resort to this strategy precipitously.
41 More generally, the lender may willingly share exogenous risk with the borrower, but
not endogenous risk. The borrower is peculiarly situated to control for the risks of fraud or
incompetent management. Understandably, the lender expects the borrower to bear the
entire risk of those contingencies. When those contingencies come to pass, the lender
pursues collection and asset realization aggressively, according to letter of the loan
agreement.
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Contracting for these various contingencies would be tricky.

Defining and

distinguishing the various potential causes of default to the satisfaction of the parties would
be a drafting nightmare. Even apart from contractual specification, some causes of default
might be impossible to observe or verify. Even if the bankers are be able to tell whether
default was caused by endogenous or exogenous events—they may be able to distinguish
fraud or mismanagement from a general economic downturn—contracting against
endogenous risk ex ante and proving endogenous causes of default to third parties ex post
would be difficult in all but the most obvious cases.
Given these contracting and enforcement costs, it may make sense ex ante to
anticipate renegotiation in the initial credit agreement and to place enormous leverage in
the hands of the lender upon default. The possibility of draconian remedies upon default
reduces adverse selection ex ante and may induce good behavior on the borrower’s part ex
post.42 Because the borrower has private information about the condition of the business,
it is important that upon default, the lender have significant bargaining power in order to
be able to extract as much value as possible in a workout.43 The lender’s ability to shut
down the business provides such leverage. This arrangement inures to borrowers’ benefit
as well. In the competitive lending markets in which banks operate, reducing banks’ losses
translates into lower borrowing costs for firms.
2.

Workout Caulk

More than any other type of contract, a credit agreement crafted by a sophisticated
lender anticipates the zone of insolvency. Indeed, a primary purpose of the agreement
from the lender’s standpoint is to rein in managerial discretion, and upon default, to give
the lender leverage over the firm’s management to impose even tighter controls.
Sophisticated creditors typically get a second chance to fill their own gaps, to the extent

42

The lender does not have to prove fraud upon default in order to shut down the business.
Even suspecting it is sufficient, since the lender’s decision to pull the plug is not
conditioned on the underlying reason for default.
43 See Kahn & Huberman, supra note 31, at 51 (explaining that credit agreement puts
enormous negotiating leverage in creditor’s hands, not necessarily to enable creditor to
foreclose but to extract value from borrower under conditions of information asymmetry).
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they exist, when the firm defaults. At that point, a “workout”—contract renegotiation—
ensues.44 Financial covenants in the standard credit agreement are typically set to trigger a
technical default well before the firm becomes insolvent.45 Workouts therefore generally
occur before the firm approaches insolvency. Given this common practice of workout
among corporate borrowers and their institutional lenders, judicial gap filling at or near
insolvency may be unnecessary. Credit contracts may be complete in important respects
by the time a firm approaches the zone of insolvency.
Creditors agree on a fixed return. Their upside is specifically capped at a given
interest rate, so they have little stake in the upside of the firm’s performance. They care
primarily about damage control on the downside, and their credit contracts reflect this.46
The average maturity of a new bank loan to a public company is less than six and a half
years.47 Use of loan proceeds is restricted. Regular operating reports to the bank are
required.

Negative covenants restrict the firm’s ability to engage in many types of

transactions without the bank’s consent. The firm’s latitude to incur new debt, make
investments or distributions, engage in transactions with affiliates, sell substantial assets,
give liens on its assets, merge, or change the nature of its business, are all explicitly
restricted in the loan agreement. Myriad technical default provisions in the contract enable
the bank to tighten the reins well before the firm flirts with the zone of insolvency.
Financial covenants, for example, require the firm to maintain certain levels of net worth,
tangible assets, total capital relative to debt, and cash flow relative to debt service
obligations.48

44

Kahn & Huberman, supra note 31; Huberman & Kahn, supra note 31.
George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1995).
46 See, e.g, Form 8-K filed by Staples Inc. (Dec. 20, 2004) (describing 2004 Revolving
Credit Agreement with Bank of America); Form 8-K filed by Stride Rite Corp. (Sep. 22,
2005) (describing revolving credit agreement with Bank of America).
47 Scott L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process
and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 115 &
Table 5 (1989).
48 Bond indentures contain similar provisions. See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. U.S.
Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930 (Del. Ch. 2004). The court’s detailed
45
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Once the debtor defaults, the bank enjoys enormous leverage to negotiate any
additional protections it desires. A properly drafted credit agreement ordinarily offers
default triggers and remedies that would allow the creditor to destroy the business. The
lender’s simplest leverage on default is its discretion to seize the borrower’s cash and cut
off its credit.49 This remedy brings the business to a halt. Formal acceleration of the debt
is another severe option.

Formal acceleration would typically trigger cross-default

provisions in the firm’s other debt contracts and other agreements. Other creditors would
therefore also be able to pursue collection against the firm. Triggering a race among
creditors to seize the firm’s assets would damage the business severely, and might cause
the firm’s demise. If the lender were secured under the original loan, seizing its collateral
would similarly hobble if not destroy the business. In exchange for forbearance, the lender
generally gets what it wants in workout.50
In workout, the leash on firm managers gets even shorter than it was under the
original loan contract. Restrictions on managerial discretion tighten. Monitoring becomes
pervasive. In addition to stricter financial covenants and stricter limits on the firm’s
transactions, the lender typically demands more frequent operating reports. The lender
also takes control of all the firm’s cash. Standard provisions in a workout agreement
include a “lock box” arrangement, in which all the firm’s cash receipts are deposited into
an account controlled by the lender. Disbursements from the account are made only at the
lender’s discretion. Disbursements are typically made only to fund existing operations,
and firm managers may be required to make daily application for cash. In addition, any
firm assets over which the lender did not already enjoy a security interest would typically
be pledged to the lender. Serial renegotiation of the same loan is not unusual. Especially
for seasonal businesses, circumstances may change from month to month or quarter to

technical discussion of note indenture provisions in that case illustrates the thoroughness
and complexity of creditor protections in standard credit arrangements.
49 A bank lender often requires its borrowers to maintain their deposit accounts with the
bank. This creates a setoff right for the bank should the borrower default. The bank may
seize the amounts in the deposit accounts to offset against the outstanding loan.
50 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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quarter. Once the bank’s bad-loan monitoring mechanisms are in place, renegotiation to
adjust covenants or payment schedules is not unduly costly.
A sophisticated bank creditor, then, seems hardly to need the benefit of a courttriggered default rule that shifts fiduciary duties in its favor as the firm nears insolvency.
The creditor fills its own gaps.51

Its original contractual arrangement with the firm

anticipates renegotiation in the event of default. The contract is designed to trigger default
well before the firm approaches insolvency and to enhance the prospects for efficient
renegotiation.
B.

The Overinvestment Problem

Even if sophisticated creditors were not adept at filling gaps in their contracts with
the firm, IFDC suffers from other problems. Inefficient vicinity-of-insolvency investment
incentives for firm managers are thought to justify a special IFDC regime. In the vicinity
of insolvency, the story goes, managers intent on maximizing shareholder value may
overinvest—take on excessively risky and even negative expected value projects that
benefit shareholders at creditors’ expense.52 The social objection is not that creditors lose
value, but that these projects destroy firm value. Creditors lose more than shareholders
gain. In effect, IFDC rules police the shareholder-manager contract to curb inefficient
endgame behavior by managers.53
This rationale for IFDC suffers from at least three criticisms. First, the contract
between shareholders and firm managers is hardly unique insofar as it may turn out to be
inefficient ex post. It is unclear why only that contract deserves judicial policing for ex
post efficiency. Second, an IFDC rule generates its own inefficiencies. And finally, it is
far from clear that overinvestment is a real problem.

51

Whether this IFDC default is merely redundant or worse is discussed in Part V below.
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Not
Reported in A.2d, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 1099, 1155 & n.55 (noting that managers should opt
for course that maximizes expected value to firm as a whole, and not simply alternative
that shareholders value most highly); Smith, supra note 7, at 221-22 (characterizing as
“absurd result” a formulation of fiduciary duty causing managers to choose inefficient
investment).
52
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1.

Why Only the Shareholders’ Contract?

One must ask why only the shareholders’ contract deserves policing for endgame
inefficiency. Contracts of all kinds may appear efficient ex ante but turn out to be
inefficient ex post. No similar policing applies to credit contracts, for example. Just as
managers may take excessive risk on behalf of shareholders through negative expected
value projects, creditors may pull the plug inefficiently pursuant to the terms of their
explicit contracts, forcing inefficient liquidation or precluding positive expected value
investments in order to assure repayment of their loans.

Investment restrictions are

common in loan agreements, and again, especially in workout arrangements, management
is kept on a fairly tight leash. The creditor’s exercise of its contractual remedies may be
inefficient ex post, but that turns out to be a risk in every contract.

By itself, this

circumstance seems insufficient to justify generalized judicial intervention.
Instead, we generally trust that private transacting will result in tolerably efficient
outcomes overall. Renegotiation of contracts that turn out to be ex post inefficient is
common, of course. But even if the parties fail to renegotiate to an efficient solution, this
ordinarily does not justify court intervention.
2.

Inefficiency with IFDC

Modifying managers’ fiduciary duties to embrace creditors when the firm is at or
near insolvency creates inefficiencies of its own. A project with positive expected value to
the firm but negative expected value to creditors may be prohibited. IFDC addresses
creditors’ distributional concerns but may also result in inefficient investment policy to the
extent an IFDC rule requires creditor primacy or incorporates some other form of creditor
veto.54 Turning down projects that would maximize the value of the firm is socially
undesirable, even if premised on avoiding disproportionate risk to creditors.55

53

See Credit Lyonnais, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. at 1155 n.55.
Some have proposed, for example, a Pareto-improving rule to govern conflicts among
claimants over the firm’s investment decisions. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders
and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 246-47 (1988). See also David Millon, Redefining
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 266 (1991) (proposing as first principle of directors’
fiduciary duty to nonshareholder constituencies that management should forego short-term
54
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Moreover, compared to the overinvestment problem under a shareholder primacy
rule, this IFDC inefficiency is likely to be much more difficult to negotiate around ex post.
Placing an entitlement with creditors requires firm managers to negotiate affirmative
permission from each creditor in order to pursue an efficient project. Holdout problems
and other transactional impediments may preclude successful contracting. Managers may
also be reluctant to seek such permission, as it might either signal the firm’s shaky
condition or prejudice managers in later litigation over the question whether the firm’s
financial condition had triggered an IFDC rule.
Ex-post IFDC inefficiency is difficult to renegotiate.56

Conversely, to curb

overinvestment under shareholder primacy requires only one creditor—albeit a relatively
sophisticated one—to negotiate ex post contractual limitations on management.

This

seems to occur frequently.
3.

What Overinvestment?

Not only is a broad fiduciary duty to creditors too blunt to be efficient, but to date,
courts’ resort to IFDC rules has not been to police inefficient investment decisions—as the
finance canon might suggest. Instead, the rule has been used more as a makeweight.
Delaware courts have piled on the IFDC burden only after managers’ conduct toward
creditors is sufficiently unsavory that several other causes of action are also clearly
available—fraud or fraudulent transfer or veil piercing, for example.57
If overinvestment were a significant problem requiring IFDC, we would expect to
see more invocation of IFDC in that context. But we don’t. Moreover, empirical data

shareholder gains where transaction would frustrate legitimate nonshareholder
expectations). Chancellor Allen’s discussion Credit Lyonnais might also be read to
incorporate such a limitation on investment decisions. See infra note 62.
55 FVM purports to remedy this inefficiency. But its underlying assumptions are quite
strong, and its prescription suffers from verifiability problems. See infra Part III.C.
56 Cf. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 34, at 119-25 (noting that varying levels of effort
required to contract around default rules also determine when a “gap” exists for courts to
fill).
57 See, e.g., Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch.
2004).
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exists that casts doubt that overinvestment is a serious problem.58 It may be that creditors’
contract protections provide a sufficient check on managers’ overinvestment tendencies.59
It may be that managerial self-interest trumps any desire to bet the company in order to
secure a return to shareholders.

Managers interested in prolonging their tenure as

managers would more likely pursue a conservative investment strategy, aiming for
survival, rather than taking a spectacular do-or-die bet. Whatever the explanation, it is far
from clear that endgame overinvestment by shareholder-wealth-maximizing managers is a
serious problem. If it is not, then IFDC seems unnecessary at best.
C.

Beyond Overinvestment: CAPM and Rationally Diversified Investors

As earlier mentioned, scholars have suggested even more drastic revisions to the
standard shareholder-centered view of fiduciary duties. Financial value maximization
(FVM) approaches have some plausible theoretical basis, but courts will have difficulty
implementing such schemes.
1.

Financial Value Maximization

Rather than simply effecting some shift in beneficiaries as the firm approaches
insolvency, Tom Smith argues that directors’ general charge should be to maximize the
sum of the values of all financial claims on the firm. According to Smith, rationally
diversified investors striking a hypothetical ex ante bargain over fiduciary duties would
agree that corporate managers should pursue financial value maximization (FVM), not
shareholder value.60 And this expanded duty should apply all the time. For Smith, the
“zone of insolvency” is incoherent. All firms are always in the zone of insolvency because
managers can always find a sizeable enough bet that puts all the firm’s equity at risk.61

58

See Barondes, supra note 22, at 59 (reviewing empirical literature).
By the time the borrower is flirting with insolvency, renegotiation has already curbed
managerial discretion severely and put in place pervasive monitoring mechanisms. See
supra Part III.A.2.
60 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
59
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This formulation is obviously inconsistent with shareholder primacy or creditor
primacy. It may also preclude a “community of interests” approach.62 As long as expected
financial value is positive, the firm should pursue the project, regardless of its
distributional consequences among classes of financial claims, even if the project has a
negative expected value for one class.
Alon Chaver and Jesse Fried generally accept of Smith’s FVM approach, adding
one important amendment. They argue for inclusion of performance creditors in the
netting algorithm once the firm’s financial condition justifies inclusion of creditors under
the protections of managerial fiduciary duties.

Otherwise, the risk exists that firm

managers might still make inefficient decisions in pursuit of FVM.63
2.

Theoretical and Practical Considerations

An FVM approach relies on one very strong assumption about investor behavior.
Not only are investors assumed to be rationally diversified—a common assumption in
discussions of securities regulatory policy—but they are assumed to hold the market
portfolio. Each investor holds capital assets of each firm in the proportions issued by the
firm. In this context, it is easy to see how investors would be indifferent as to wealth
transfers between classes of a firm’s securities as long as total financial value were
maximized. In fact, the assumption is so strong it eliminates the problem entirely. The
assumption that all investors hold capital assets in the exact proportions issued by each

62

Chancellor Allen’s famous discussion in Credit Lyonnais is ambiguous on this question
of efficiency versus distribution. He argues that directors’ fiduciary duties should run to
the “corporate enterprise,” but his hypothetical does not address the thorny distribution
problem. In his hypothetical, the advisable course maximizes firm value and also
generates positive returns for creditors and shareholders. It leaves bondholders paid in full
and offers some return to shareholders. Credit Lyonnais, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. at 1155 n.55.
It’s not bad for anybody. So it fails to confront the difficult question whether the pursuit of
firm value maximization may permissibly come at a risk to creditors. If including creditors
in the “community of interests” implies some Pareto-improving criteria for any new
project, then it is inconsistent with FVM, under which no class of financial claims enjoys
any expectation of Pareto-improvement with respect to firm projects.
63 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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firm effectively assumes away all interclass investor conflict. It makes the hypothetical
contract analysis pretty straightforward, but the assumption is doing all the work.
Of course, no investor actually holds the market portfolio.

Even financial

economists acknowledge its impracticality.64 As long as this is so, there will always be
conflict among classes of financial claims. But perhaps the assumption, while quite strong,
is still close enough?

Many investors are diversified, and diversification to largely

eliminate non-systematic risk may not require very many holdings.

So while actual

investors might not be indifferent as to distributional consequences in particular cases, they
might still prefer FVM overall in order to maximize the value of their portfolios over the
long run.65
Even if this is right—which is far from clear—FVM may be very difficult to
implement. Courts will have difficulty comparing the effects of competing prospective
investment alternatives on total financial value, or comparing the actual outcome of a
chosen investment to the hypothetical outcome of an alternative investment that was never
made. Creditors will have difficulty monitoring a firm’s investment policy as well.66 This
explains why bond indentures ordinarily rely on dividend and financing restrictions to
64

Haim Levy, Equilibrium in an Imperfect Market: A Constraint on the Number of
Securities in the Portfolio, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 643 (1978); Richard Roll, A Critique of the
Asset Pricing Theory’s Tests, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 129 (1977). Moreover, what counts as the
appropriate “market” for purposes of the market portfolio is not without controversy. See
id.
65 This scenario seems counterfactual, however, given the elaborate covenant protections
that we observe in corporate bond indentures and loan agreements. Ninety-five percent of
corporate bonds are held by large institutions.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
TH
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107 CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND
PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 78 (COMM. PRINT 2002). These are the investors we would
most expect to be rationally diversified.
66
[P]roduction/investment policy is very expensive to monitor. . . . It is expensive
even to ascertain when the firms’ production/investment policy is not optimal,
since such a determination depends on magnitudes which are difficult to observe.
The high monitoring costs which would be associated with restrictive
production/investment covenants . . . dictate that few production/investment
decisions will be contractually proscribed.
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optimize the firm’s investment policy, instead of covenants directly restricting investment
policy.67 Any court-supplied standard for investment policy is difficult to police—even
shareholder primacy—but adding new classes of beneficiaries is likely to complicate the
task even further.68 The end result of such an approach may be to render managers
accountable to no one.69
More generally, FVM suffers from the same problem as other IFDC standards.
Gap filling is a far weaker rationale for IFDC than for fiduciary duties to shareholders. In
the situation where a sophisticated credit agreement leaves no gaps, it is hard to see how
FVM should apply. Should FVM include creditors with their own contract protections?
Or should the particular creditors with contract protection be deemed to have opted out of
their default protection? Consistent with a gap filling theory, FVM would then charge
managers to maximize value only for those financial claimants who had not opted out.
The maximization calculus gets unwieldy pretty quickly.

Ultimately, if commercial

creditors generally protect themselves by contract, it is difficult to see why we need FVM
or any other IFDC standard.
IV.

ACTUAL BARGAINS IN THE VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY

Credit Lyonnais and the more recent Delaware decision in Production Resources70
form the endpoints of Delaware’s vicinity-of-insolvency lineage. A quick look at these
endpoints illustrates several things. First, it shows the extent of vicinity-of-insolvency
renegotiation. Sophisticated creditors typically renegotiate, so that IFDC gap filling hardly
Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 153 (1979).
67 Id. at 125, 153.
68 As discussed below, given the business judgment rule and other liability-insulating
features of corporate law, expanding the types of beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary
duties may have little effect on managerial discretion. See infra Part V.A.1.
69 See William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385,
419 & n.137-42 (1990) (using Arrow’s theorem to illustrate accountability problem);
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L.
Rev. 23 (1991) (arguing that other constituency statutes merely render managers
accountable to no one).
70 Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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seems necessary. Second, even in addition to the parties’ explicit gap filling by contract,
other adequate legal remedies exist to constrain borrower misbehavior. IFDC offers at best
redundant protection for creditors in the insolvency zone.
A.

Revisiting Credit Lyonnais

From an incomplete contracts perspective, it is ironic that Credit Lyonnais should
be the touchstone case for any vicinity-of-insolvency discussion. Though Chancellor
Allen’s important discussion of managers’ perverse incentives is largely confined to a
footnote—rightly in my view, given the facts of that case—and though Credit Lyonnais
remains officially an unpublished opinion, it is widely regarded as the seminal judicial
explication for expanding IFDC into the vicinity of insolvency. Later courts explicitly
adopt the analysis in Chancellor Allen’s dictum. Credit Lyonnais was not a case, however,
crying out for judicial gap filling. Quite the opposite.
The case involved a workout between a sophisticated bank creditor on the one
hand—Credit Lyonnais (the “Bank”)—and a corporate borrower, MGM, and its
controlling shareholder, Giancarlo Parretti, on the other. By the time the case descended
into litigation, the parties had already implemented a complicated corporate governance
arrangement. They had filled their own gaps. Credit Lyonnais was a major lender to both
MGM and its parent. Its loans were secured by a controlling block of MGM stock. When
MGM was forced into bankruptcy by its trade creditors, the Bank agreed to finance
MGM’s exit from bankruptcy, but with conditions. The Bank agreed to forbear from
foreclosing on its stock pledge and taking explicit control of MGM, and the parties
negotiated a Corporate Governance Agreement (CGA).

This agreement set out a

comprehensive scheme for management of MGM, including appointment of Alan Ladd—
the Bank’s choice—for chairman and CEO and the formation of an executive committee to
exercise almost all corporate powers delegable under Delaware law.71 At the insistence of

71

Credit Lyonnais, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. at 1118. The power to file bankruptcy, issue
securities or appoint or remove the chairman and CEO were all reserved to the board and
would require a vote of four of the five directors. Id. After difficulties arose between the
bank and Parretti over control of MGM under the CGA, a bank-nominated party acceptable
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the controlling shareholder Parretti, the CGA also included explicit “exit” strategies for
MGM—conditions under which the CGA would terminate, thereby ending the Bank’s
influence over the firm’s management.72 To insure compliance with the CGA, the Bank
obtained the right to vote its controlling block of MGM stock pursuant to a voting trust.
The Voting Trust Agreement creating this trust was placed in escrow, and the Bank was
given sole discretion to break the escrow to render the voting trust effective.73 Parretti
acceded to these arrangements.
Ultimately, Parretti breached the CGA by attempting to wrest control from the
CGA-created management structure. The Bank terminated the escrow on the voting trust
and exercised its voting power to remove Parretti and his confederates from the board of
directors. The Bank followed with a suit for a judicial determination that its elected board
was the rightful board of MGM.
In this suit, Parretti claimed that CEO Ladd breached his fiduciary duty to MGM’s
parent by failing to facilitate asset sales that Parretti sought in order to raise capital to pay
off the Bank and regain control of MGM. The court rightly gave short shrift to this
argument. The Bank retained veto rights over significant asset sales in any event74—a
standard term in every credit agreement, and one that gets tightened as a matter of routine
in workout. Moreover, even absent a Bank veto, Parretti could hardly have expected that
Ladd or the management structure created at the Bank’s behest would do his bidding or fail
to consider the Bank’s wishes and interests, especially given the Bank’s grip on the
controlling shares of MGM. Parretti had relinquished control over MGM. He had also

to Parretti was appointed as President of MGM in an effort to repair the situation. Id. at
1129.
72 In particular, Parretti negotiated for a provision that he needed only the votes of his own
designees on the board of directors to cause the corporation to issue securities if the
proceeds were used to retire the bank’s debt. In effect, Parretti could buy out the bank’s
debt if he could find equity investors. Id. at 1119. “This point was significant. It meant
that, if Parretti could find equity investors, he could use their investment to pay down debt
and remove the bank from the picture, without having to involve the bank-designated
directors or the executive committee comprised of the same individuals.” Id.
73 Id. at 1122 n.25.
74 Id. at 1154.
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relinquished any expectation that MGM would be run for his benefit or the benefit of other
pre-default shareholders.
Here, the actual terms of the arrangement between the Bank and MGM supply
sufficient basis for concluding that Ladd’s primary duty was to the creditors. None of the
parties could have had any expectation otherwise. Their contract left no gaps to fill.75 The
actual bargain obviated any need to construct a hypothetical bargain. While the famous
vicinity-of-insolvency discussion was novel and interesting, its usefulness in deciding the
case was limited.76
B.

The Actual Bargain in Production Resources

Like Credit Lyonnais, the defaulted debt in Production Resources triggered a
renegotiation between debtor and creditor.77 Pursuant to a “resolution agreement,” the
debtor agreed to register 6.7 million shares of its stock for the creditor’s benefit. The
debtor and its CEO apparently had also agreed at some point to sell stock owned by a
subsidiary to pay off the debt.78 The debtor lived up to neither of these commitments, but
instead made large payments to insiders and affiliated companies, according to the
complaint.
The opinion offers no more detail on the terms of the renegotiated deal, but there
may have been no more details to offer. The renegotiated deal was likely to have been
much less elaborate than in Credit Lyonnais. The creditor Production Resources was a
75

Chancellor Allen’s conclusion that the bank was acting in the interests of the entire
community seems implausible, if only because the bank was acting antithetically to
the expressed desires of one principal shareholder, obviously a member of the
corporate community. Rather, consistent with the restructuring agreement, the
bank was simply trying to get paid.
Lipson, supra note 9, at 1224.
76 See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 710 (2004) (noting that Chancellor Allen’s
discussion of vicinity-of-insolvency fiduciary duties was obiter dictum); Lipson, supra
note 9, at 1224 & n.162 (suggesting that Chancellor Allen’s discussion of entity primacy
“may be the worst kind of dicta—not simply irrelevant to the holding, but actually contrary
to it.”).
77 Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 778 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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trade creditor seeking to collect on “expensive computer controlled audio systems”
supplied to the debtor.79 We might expect trade creditors’ workouts with debtors to
involve less elaborate agreements and less specific protections than when the creditor is a
sophisticated financial institution. Trade creditors’ primary business, after all, is supplying
goods or non-financial services. Collection, while no doubt important, is an ancillary
activity, and trade creditors may generally not have the expertise to negotiate intricate
financial covenants or other detailed protections that financial creditors enjoy.
Despite these relative disadvantages for the trade creditor, the gap filling rationale
for IFDC fares no better in this context than with the sophisticated bank creditor in Credit
Lyonnais. The post-default resolution agreement evidences that the parties negotiated
specifically in anticipation of financial distress. Financial distress was not an overlooked
contingency. Moreover, as with other cases, Production Resources presents a scenario
suggesting strongly that existing debtor-creditor laws were sufficient to protect creditor
interests.

Fraudulent transfer and veil piercing come immediately to mind.

“[T[he

complaint does plead . . . that the board has engaged in conscious wrongdoing.”80
V.

DOES IFDC MATTER?

If IFDC is unnecessary, is it harmful? The preceding discussion suggests that
IFDC adds little to the extant legal and contractual protections creditors enjoy in the
insolvency zone. This by itself would not imply that repeal of IFDC was necessary. The
doctrine may simply be harmless, adding nothing but taking nothing away. Moreover, the
literature on fiduciary duties to shareholders suggests that such duties may be fairly weak
constraints on managerial misbehavior, especially the duty of care. Applying these duties
in favor of creditors, therefore, may likewise not matter very much.
The potential for mischief may be small.

However, as I describe below, a

narrowing or repeal of the IFDC rule may still be warranted. At the margin, IFDC may
enable creditors to impede efficient vicinity-of-insolvency investment. In addition, in a
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Id at 801 n.88.
Id. at 777.
80 Id.
79
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world without IFDC, creditors have stronger incentives to craft explicit ex ante contractual
restrictions to curb overinvestment. Explicit ex ante contract terms are likely to benefit
shareholders as well as creditors, as compared to a regime in which creditor protection
depends on a vague court-supplied ex post standard.
Below I first review the arguments for why the effects of IFDC are likely to be
small. Next, I suggest that despite the small effects, an IFDC rule may do harm.
A.

IFDC May Not Matter
1.

Procedural Context: the Business Judgment Rule, Limitations on
Liability, and Derivative Actions

The substantive content of fiduciary duties does not by itself describe the liability
regime to which firm managers are subjected. The business judgment rule significantly
ameliorates the possibility of liability by creating liberal running room for managers in the
absence of fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest,81 and provided that any decision making
process was rational or conducted in good faith.82 In addition, “raincoat” statutes in
Delaware and other states authorize corporations to insulate directors from money damages
for breach of the duty of care through explicit charter provisions.83 Especially in public
company charters, exculpation provisions are common. These insulating mechanisms
should operate to shield managers from duty of care liability, whether the duty runs to
shareholders or creditors.84 Therefore, including creditors as beneficiaries of the duty of
care may matter little.
Similarly, IFDC claims are most likely to take the form of derivative actions.85 An
IFDC rule therefore merely creates standing for creditors to press management to right

81

Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968).
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
83 E.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4).
84 Production Resources so held. Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, Inc., 863
A.2d 772, 793 (Del. Ch. 2004).
85 Production Resources does leave open the possibility that a creditor may pursue a direct
claim for self-dealing or bad faith. Id. at 799-800.
82
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wrongs done to the corporation.86 Whether managers are feathering their own nests or are
merely incompetent, IFDC simply allows creditors to press the claims of the corporation in
a representative capacity, as shareholders ordinarily do when the firm is solvent.87
Recoveries go to the firm, so the only question is which faction enjoys the right to press the
claim. In this context of righting wrongs done to the firm, the interests of shareholders and
creditors are likely to coincide in many cases.88 Even in the event of conflict, though, the
insulating mechanisms described above suggest that managers will enjoy broad discretion
despite the dissatisfaction of either shareholders or creditors.
2.

Existing Creditor Protection Rules

Even in the absence of IFDC, legal rules exist to protect creditors from debtors’
endgame maneuvers.

Self-dealing while the firm is insolvent, for example, would

typically trigger fraudulent transfer liability to creditors.89 Fraud, fraudulent transfer law,
and veil piercing doctrine all seem to be implicated with some regularity in cases invoking
IFDC rules. The cases in which IFDC rules may be critical are scarce.
B.

Repealing IFDC rules

The incremental ex post benefit to creditors from IFDC rules appear to be very
small. On the other hand, both ex post and ex ante effects of IFDC rules may possibly be
pernicious. Ex post, as earlier noted, creditors may be able to block efficient investment by
the firm when IFDC requires creditor wealth maximization.90 Renegotiation to an efficient
outcome may be difficult, since firm management might have to obtain the consent of
multiple creditors. Leaving shareholders as the sole beneficiaries of management fiduciary
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Id. at 776.
Id. at 792.
88 For example, if managers are stealing from the corporation, all outside investors are
harmed. The primary theoretical shareholder-creditor conflict involves overinvestment,
but as we have discussed, there is some evidence that this conflict is more theoretical than
real. See supra Part III.B.3.
89 The firm presumably does not receive reasonably equivalent value. Constructive fraud
liability will therefore obtain. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a).
90 See supra Part III.B.2.
87
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duties is preferable, since efficient restrictions to prevent vicinity-of-insolvency
overinvestment may be achieved by even one creditor.
Ex ante, both shareholders and creditors are likely to be better off with explicit
contract terms, rather than vague ex post standards, to contain any overinvestment in the
vicinity of insolvency. Vague standards may offer only episodic protection in any event,
especially given the healthy insulation from duty of care liability that directors enjoy. To
the extent the promise of vague court-implied future protection encourages creditors not to
craft explicit zone-of-insolvency restrictions on firm management ex ante, all parties may
be worse off. Vague standards invite both misbehavior and litigation.91
If it is costly for the courts to determine what the parties would have
wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule that induces the parties to
contract explicitly. In other words, penalty defaults are appropriate when it is
cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex
post what the parties would have wanted. Courts, which are publicly subsidized,
should give parties incentives to negotiate ex ante by penalizing them for
inefficient gaps.92
VI.

CONCLUSION

The standard incomplete contracts approach to corporate fiduciary duties to
shareholders does not translate neatly to justify fiduciary duties to creditors when a firm is
at or near insolvency. Sophisticated commercial creditors have typically filled any gaps in
their contracts by the time the firm approaches insolvency. Overinvestment seems a
problem more theoretical than real, and in any event, crafting contractual curbs on
overinvestment by shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm managers is likely to be easier
than contracting around IFDC-induced inefficient investment restrictions. IFDC rules may

91

See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 601-03 (noting that standards create moral
hazard).
The vaguer the legal standard and the more that is at stake, the more likely the party
is to resolve doubts in its own favor. A party that resolves doubts in this way will
attempt to maximize private gains at the expense of joint welfare maximization.
Therefore, a standard is efficient only when the party on whom it confers discretion
has the incentive to maximize joint returns in the course of maximizing its private
gain.
Id. at 603.
92 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 56, at 93.
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not matter much, given the business judgment rule, raincoat statutes, the likelihood that
many IFDC claims would be derivative, and the existence of other creditor protection
rules. But vague standards should generally be avoided, and to the extent creditors do not
already do so, they should be encouraged to draft their own vicinity-of-insolvency
protections.
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